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Abstract
SZAROWSKÁ IRENA: Shi  in tax burden and its impact on economic growth in the European Union.  Acta 
Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 2013, LXI, No. 4, pp. 1153–1160
This article deals with a tax burden in the European Union in as ﬁ nancial and economic crisis has 
impacted also on tax systems in the European Union. Governments’ tax measure aims to consolidate 
public ﬁ nance and promote an economic growth. The article provides empirical evidence on a shi  
in a tax burden and its structure and analyzes the eﬀ ects of shi  in tax burden on economic growth in 
the EU. It is used the Eurostat deﬁ nition to categorize tax burden by economic functions and implicit 
rates of consumption, labour and capital are investigated. The analysis is based on annual data of the 
EU member states in a period 1995–2010. On average, labour taxes have decreased by 1.9 p.p., capital 
taxes have also decreased – by 2.1 p.p., but consumption taxes have mildly increased by 0.4 p.p. in 
the European Union in a period 1995–2010. Pairwise Granger Causality Test was used for examining 
relations between economic growth and tax burden by economic functions in short-term. Results 
conﬁ rm that there is two-way causality between change of implicit tax rate of consumption and GDP 
growth; and also GDP growth Granger-causes change of implicit tax rate of capital and implicit tax rate 
of labour through one-way causality.
tax burden, tax shi , implicit tax rates, growth conductive system, economic functions, economic 
growth 
1 INTRODUCTION
Financial and economic crisis has also impacted on 
tax systems in the European Union. The complexity 
of today’s global economic environment increases 
importance of identifying and understanding the 
key factors aﬀ ecting economic growth. Policymakers 
are struggling to ﬁ nd ways to adapt and cope with 
consequences of ﬁ nancial and economic crisis on 
public revenues. The tax structure is one important 
aspect of the concept of the quality of taxation. It 
deals with the design of tax policy to achieve desired 
policy objectives, while at the same time promoting 
economic growth, minimizing distortions and 
reducing the cost of tax collection. Of course, it is 
necessary to realize tax changes with respect to stay 
competitive with other countries.
As it is described in The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2012–2013 (2012), taxation is very important 
factor for doing business. Respondents – business 
executives were asked to select from a list of 16 
factors the ﬁ ve most problematic for doing business 
in their economy and rank them. Published data 
indicates that tax rates and tax regulations belong 
to the most problematic factors. In a third of the EU 
countries, the tax measures were identiﬁ ed as the 
most problematic factor for doing business in the 
country at all.
The aim of the paper is to examine eﬀ ects of 
taxation by economic functions on economic 
growth and to provide direct empirical evidence 
in the European Union. It is used the Eurostat’s 
deﬁ nition to categorize tax burden by economic 
functions and implicit tax rates of consumption, 
labour and capital are investigated. The analysis is 
based on annual panel data of the EU member states 
in a period 1995–2010. Pairwise Granger Causality 
Test is used as the main method of research. 
2 Literature review
The theoretical eﬀ ect of taxation on economic 
performance is not apparent matter. There is 
voluminous literature on the eﬀ ects of taxes on 
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the economy and its rate of growth (Barro, 1991; 
Mendoza et al., 1994; Slemrod, 1995; Leibfritz, 
Thornton and Bibbee, 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer, 
2000; Acemoglu, 2009 or Acemoglu et al., 2012). 
Myles (2009) reviewed diﬀ erent production 
functions and eﬀ ects of taxation on GDP and 
economic growth. However, using statistical data 
for comparing levels of taxation and economic 
performance also does not provide unequivocal 
conclusions (Zipfel and Heinrichs, 2012). 
Many studies present negative relationships 
between taxes and economic growth and 
recommend lowering tax rates. Plosser (1992) found 
a signiﬁ cant negative correlation between the level 
of taxes on income and proﬁ ts (as a share of GDP) 
and growth of real per capita GDP. King and Rebelo 
(1990) simulated changes in the income tax by 
applying an endogenous growth model and ﬁ nd that 
an increase from 20 per cent to 30 per cent reduces 
the rate of growth by 2 percentage points. Hill (2008) 
estimated the growth–maximizing size of states for 
the United States in 1960–1990 was between 9% and 
29% of GDP. Also Romero-Á vila and Strauch (2008) 
stated that government consumption and direct 
taxation negatively aﬀ ect growth rates of GDP per 
capita in the EU-15 in the last 40 years. Johansson 
et al. (2008) investigated the design of tax structures 
to promote economic growth. Corporate taxes were 
found to be most harmful for growth, followed by 
personal income taxes, and then consumption taxes. 
Recurrent taxes on immovable property appear to 
have the least impact. 
Lee and Gordon (2005) explored how tax policies 
in fact aﬀ ect a country’s growth rate, using cross-
country data during 1970–1997. They found that 
statutory corporate tax rates are signiﬁ cantly 
negatively correlated with cross-sectional 
diﬀ erences in average economic growth rates. 
The coeﬃ  cient estimates suggest that a cut in the 
corporate tax rate by 10 p.p. will raise the annual 
growth rate by one to two percentage points.
Karras and Furceri (2009) examined the eﬀ ects of 
changes in taxes on economic growth. Using annual 
data from 1965 to 2003 for a panel of 19 European 
economies, the results show that the eﬀ ect of an 
increase in taxes on real GDP per capita is negative 
and persistent. An increase in the total tax rate by 1% 
of GDP has an eﬀ ect on real GDP per capita of minus 
0.5% to minus 1% in the long run. The ﬁ ndings also 
imply that increases in social security contributions 
or taxes on goods and services have larger negative 
eﬀ ects on per capita output than increases in 
income tax. 
Prammer (2011) summarized indications on how 
taxation might inﬂ uence growth relevant decisions.
Taxes on labour can aﬀ ect decisions in three major 
ways by altering: i) the allocation of time between 
labour and leisure ii) human capital accumulation 
iii) occupational and entrepreneurial behavior 
and choices. Labour taxes can also aﬀ ect labour 
supply decisions, both concerning the decision to 
participate in the labour market and the amount of 
hours worked (García et al., 2011; Szarowská, 2011; 
Johansson et al., 2008). However, the exact eﬀ ect 
of taxation on labour supply can theoretically not 
be determined as the substitution eﬀ ect and the 
income eﬀ ect work in opposite directions. The 
exact impact of labour taxes on the labour market 
depends on the labour demand elasticity, the degree 
of centralization of the wage bargaining and the 
distribution of incomes among diﬀ erent income 
levels (Loretz, 2008).
Taxes on capital can inﬂ uence the rate of capital 
accumulation. By changing the return on capital, 
they might discourage saving and investment by 
economic agents (ﬁ rms or individuals); hence capital 
taxes alter the intertemporal allocation of resources. 
Lower levels of investment eventually lower the 
capital stock which in turn impacts on growth. Thus, 
due to the intertemporal structure capital taxation 
accumulates the distortions over time (Vermeend 
et al., 2008). 
Consumption taxes are o en regarded as less 
distortionary than income taxes, as they do not 
distort intertemporal decisions the way income taxes 
do. Consumption taxes fall partly on accumulated 
assets, which are an inelastic tax base. Moreover, 
consumption taxes do not impact on the returns to 
saving and, usually, do not have a progressive tax 
structure (Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000).
With respect to literature above, it is possible to 
summarize that some taxes are more conducive 
to growth than others. Capital taxes cause very 
negative on growth. Labour taxes are less growth 
conducive; strong progressivity of income tax rates 
is regarded as particularly negative in this context. 
Consumption taxes are compatible with growth 
as they have small eﬀ ect on decisions by economic 
agents regarding growth factors. Due to the negative 
growth eﬀ ect of labour and capital taxes, it can be 
expected that in a growth-conducive system the 
tax burden of taxes on these factors should be kept 
lower in relation to consumption taxes.
3 METHODS AND RESOURCES
As it is known, tax burden has very diﬀ erent 
structure and size in each country. The goal of the 
article is to examine eﬀ ects of taxation by economic 
functions on economic growth and to provide direct 
empirical evidence in the European Union. Hence, 
it is used the Eurostat’s deﬁ nition to categorize tax 
burden by economic functions and implicit tax rates 
of consumption, labour and capital are investigated. 
The analysis is based on annual panel data of the EU 
member states in a period 1995–2010 (the longest 
available time series). Basic panel model identiﬁ ers 
are country i and time t. The analysis uses data on tax 
burden by economic functions, namely implicit tax 
rates of consumption (ITR_C), labour (ITR_L) and 
capital (ITR_K) from Eurostat. Annual data on GDP 
at market prices are also taken from Eurostat and 
they are based on accrual basis. Tab. I presents basic 
variables and their descriptive statistics. 
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It is necessary to test the stationary time series 
before starting econometric analysis. A stationary 
time series is required because any variable which 
stochastically permanently departs from its mean 
value cannot be aﬀ ected by long period variable, 
which returns to its mean value (eﬀ ect may be only 
in a short term). Recent literature suggests that 
panel-based unit root tests have higher power than 
unit root tests based on individual time series. Panel 
unit root tests are similar, but not identical, to unit 
root tests carried out on a single series (Dougherty, 
2007). We used panel unit root tests (Levin, Lin 
and Chu; Breitung; Im, Pesaran and Shin; Fisher-
type tests using ADF and Fisher PP tests) and they 
identiﬁ ed that all data is stationary I(0). Therefore, 
it is possible to analyze the eﬀ ect of taxation on 
economic performance based on level data. 
Finally, we investigate causal relationship between 
economic growth and tax burden by economic 
functions using Granger causality methodology. 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests can determine 
dynamic relations between two variables in short-
term. A time series X is said to Granger cause Y if it can 
be shown, that those X values provide statistically 
signiﬁ cant information about future values of Y 
(Granger, 1969). If a time series is stationary, the test 
is performed using the level values of two (or more) 
variables. If the variables are non-stationary, then 
the test is done using ﬁ rst (or higher) diﬀ erences. 
The number of lags to be included is usually chosen 
using an information criterion. Any particular 
lagged value of one of the variables is retained in 
the regression if (1) it is signiﬁ cant according to 
a t-test, and (2) it and the other lagged values of the 
variable jointly add explanatory power to the model 
according to an F-test. Then the null hypothesis of 
no Granger causality is not rejected if and only if no 
lagged values of an explanatory variable have been 
retained in the regression.
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Shi  in a taxation by economic functions
The ﬁ nancial and economic crisis also has an 
impact on tax systems and the structure of tax mix 
in the EU. Tax burden and its structure are regularly 
I: Descriptive statistics of variables
ITR_C ITR_L ITR_K GDP_growth
Mean 21.30 35.66 24.80 2.92
Median 20.40 37.00 23.70 3.30
Maximum 34.20 49.30 49.90 11.70
Minimum 11.10 20.80 4.80 −17.70
Std. Dev. 4.45 6.40 9.24 3.60
Observations 379 379 339 376
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Eurostat (2012)
 
1: Share of taxes by economic functions in total revenue (1995, 2010)
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Eurostat (2012)
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analyzed by Eurostat. Next ﬁ gures depict following 
groups of taxes: taxes on labour (including social 
security contributions), capital (taxes on stocks of 
capital/wealth and taxes on capital and business 
income) and consumption (VAT and excise duties). 
Fig. 1 presents structure of tax mix and share of 
taxes in total revenues in years 1995 and 2010 – the 
latest year for which detailed data are available.
The structure of tax burden by economic 
functions reveals that the eastern EU member states 
generate a relatively high share of total revenues 
through consumption taxes. In the northern 
and central European states, revenues come 
predominantly from labour taxes. This is the result 
of a relatively high burden on the factor labour (for 
details look at Eurostat, 2012) − compared with the 
EU average. Especially in central EU member states 
such as Czech Republic, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands this is due to the large share of social 
security contributions. Denmark is a special case as 
social security revenues there only amount to 1% of 
GDP (in 2010). 
However, governments have to ﬁ nd the way how to 
face with the diﬃ  cult of consolidating their budgets 
while at the same time promoting economic growth. 
Raising consumption taxes while at the same time 
lowering taxes on labour and capital can stimulate 
an economic growth. Taxation of labour and 
capital should be kept low as it distorts decisions by 
economic agents, which in turn negatively impacts 
the use of the growth factors labour, capital and 
technological progress. Taxation on consumption 
has less adverse eﬀ ects in this respect. As Zipfel 
and Heinrichs (2012) point out, since the turn of 
the millennium Europe has witnessed a slight 
trend towards more growth-conducive tax systems. 
Tax systems have been redesigned mainly in the 
countries of northern and eastern Europe, whereas 
central Europe has seen little change. 
Fig. 2 summarizes the development of implicit tax 
rates in the EU27 and also in core (EU15) and new 
EU member states. Diﬀ erences between old and new 
member states are the smallest for consumption 
taxes, they tend to converge. On the other side, the 
biggest diﬀ erence is observed for capital taxes, new 
member states have, on average, implicit tax rate on 
capital smaller by 10 p.p than old member states. 
New member states are o en criticized for harmful 
tax competition (for details look at Szarowská, 2010). 
On average, labour taxes decreased by 1.9 p.p, capital 
taxes also decreased – by 2.1 p.p., but consumption 
taxes mildly increased by 0.4 p.p. in selected period. 
This development is in line with tax and economic 
theory as most authors point out that the increase of 
capital mobility has raised concerns that excessive 
levels of taxation can inﬂ uence capital and 
especially move proﬁ ts to low tax jurisdictions. At 
the same time, they hope to attract foreign capital 
investments by oﬀ ering an attractive tax treatment. 
Taxes on capital and corporate income may have 
distorted eﬀ ects on the market, particularly in 
highly integrated areas like the EU internal market. 
These distortions may also impact personal income 
taxes because taxes on capital reduce capital 
accumulation and therefore negatively impact 
productivity levels, which in turn depress wages. 
Next, the fact that capital is generally more mobile 
than labour has generated the apprehension that the 
burden of taxation would be shi ed from the former 
to the latter. Equity considerations also feature 
prominently in the debate on the taxation of capital 
held by individuals, given that capital is more lightly 
taxed than labour income, and is o en taxed at ﬂ at 
rates, which calls for an eﬀ ective taxation of capital 
income to avoid elimination the progressivity of the 
income tax of its meaning. The relative mobility of 
capital has stimulated the apprehension about tax 
competition and a subsequent race-to-the-bottom 
in capital tax rates (Hill, 2008; Johansson et al., 2008; 
2: Development of ITRs (1995–2010)
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Eurostat (2012)
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Acemoglu, 2009; Karras and Furceri, 2009; García 
et al., 2011; Prammer, 2011).
Fig. 3 summarizes the shi  between implicit tax 
rates on consumption and labour in percentage 
points in individual EU countries between 
1995–2010. It is necessary to point the fact that 
ﬁ gure presents changes in implicit tax burden but it 
does not express a ﬁ nal value of tax burden. A third 
of EU member states (BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, LT, 
RO, SE) increased consumption taxes and at the 
same time decreased labour taxes. Average increase 
of consumption taxes is very low and it is caused by 
changes of VAT in most countries. Lowering labour 
taxes is mostly connected with decreasing social 
security contribution and eﬀ ort to make labour 
costs more competitive. 
The second third of EU member states (FI, FR, HU, 
IE, LV, PL, SI, SK, UK) decreased labour and also 
consumption taxes. This development was mainly 
connected with the eﬀ ort to make the tax systems 
more growth conductive and attractive. Next group 
of states (AT, CY, EL, ES, LU, MT, NL) increased both 
types of taxes, only Italy and Portugal decreased 
consumption and increased labour taxes. 
Fig. 4a presents the changes of taxation by 
economic functions between 1995 and 2010 in 
individual member states. Development in the 
beginning of analyzed period was signiﬁ cantly 
3: Shift between ITRs on consumption and labour in p.p. (1995–2010)
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Eurostat (2012)
4: Changes of taxation by economic functions – difference in p.p. 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Eurostat (2012)
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inﬂ uenced by transformation process (especially in 
new member states), hence Fig. 4b shows a shorter 
period (2000–2010). 
The violet lines show the total change of implicit 
tax burden in EU member states. The ﬁ gures 
highlight that some member states only shi ed 
taxation from one type of taxes to another in 
the period under consideration. The Spain is an 
example of zero total changes in implicit tax burden 
as it has shi ed the burden of taxation from capital 
taxes (−2.4 p.p.) to labour (+2 p.p.) and consumption 
taxes (+0.4 p.p.). Similar development can be seen 
in Austria or Bulgaria. The highest diﬀ erence in 
tax burden can be found in Slovakia (decrease 
more than 34 p.p.) and Cyprus (increase nearly 24 
p.p.) during the period 1995–2010. A er the year 
2000, the only six countries have positive total 
change of monitored ITRs. Signiﬁ cant structural 
changes in ﬁ scal policy are the main reasons for 
the development and they have diﬀ erent context 
in the short term and over a medium to longer-term 
horizon. For the short run, countries have attempted 
to stimulate demand via tax relief, reducing the 
eﬀ ects on the real economy. In the medium to long 
term, ﬁ scal consolidation and obtaining suﬃ  cient 
public revenues (i.e. the case of Cyprus and Italy) is 
given priority, which may lead to tax hikes. 
4.2 Eﬀ ects of taxation by economic functions 
on economic growth 
Finally, we used Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
for examining relations between economic growth 
(GDP_growth) and tax burden by economic functions 
(ITR_C, ITR_L, ITR_K) in short-term. The optimal 
number of lag is two and it was identiﬁ ed using 
information criteria. It is necessary to note that two-
way causation is frequently the case: GDP growth 
Granger causes implicit tax rate and implicit tax rate 
Granger causes GDP growth. The null hypothesis 
should be rejecting if probability is less than 0.05 
(usual level of statistical signiﬁ cance). 
The example of null hypothesis is that economic 
growth does not Granger-cause the implicit tax 
rate of consumption (labour, capital) and that the 
implicit tax rate of consumption (labour, capital) 
does not Granger-cause economic growth. Bold 
values in Tab. II indicate hypothesis which should 
be rejected.
Results in Tab. II express that there is two-
way causality between change of implicit tax rate 
of consumption and GDP growth and one-way 
causality between change of implicit tax rate of 
capital and implicit tax rate of labour and GDP 
growth. It is interesting that Pairwise Granger 
Causality Tests have not conﬁ rmed inverse causality, 
as the theory presents negative impact of labour 
taxes on economic growth (Johansson et al., 2008; 
Prammer, 2011). The reason can be found in using 
diﬀ erent type of data – we used cumulated implicit 
tax rates whereas other researchers have used 
individual tax rates. 
It is important to mention that the statement 
for example ‘implicit tax rate of consumption 
Granger causes GDP growth‘ does not imply that 
GDP growth is the eﬀ ect or the result of implicit tax 
rate of consumption. Granger causality measures 
precedence and information content but does not 
by itself indicate causality in the more common use 
of the term. 
II: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests for GDP growth and dITRs (lags: 2)
Null Hypothesis: Observations F-Statistic Prob. 
dITR_C does not Granger Cause GDP_growth
307
4.31991 0.0141
GDP_growth does not Granger Cause dITR_C 4.50509 0.0118
dITR_L does not Granger Cause GDP_growth
307
1.81689 0.1643
GDP_growth does not Granger Cause dITR_L 8.89758 0.0002
dITR_K does not Granger Cause GDP_growth
270
1.66551 0.1911
GDP_growth does not Granger Cause dITR_K 8.88235 0.0002
dITR_L does not Granger Cause dITR_C
307
2.69666 0.0691
dITR_C does not Granger Cause dITR_L 0.05029 0.9510
dITR_K does not Granger Cause dITR_C
270
0.16038 0.8519
DITR_C does not Granger Cause DITR_K 2.22521 0.1101
dITR_K does not Granger Cause dITR_L
270
0.56772 0.5675
dITR_L does not Granger Cause dITR_K 0.31647 0.729
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Eurostat (2012)
5 CONCLUSION
The goal of the article was to examine eﬀ ects of taxation by economic functions on economic growth 
and to provide direct empirical evidence in the European Union. It was used the Eurostat’s deﬁ nition 
to categorize tax burden by economic functions and implicit rates of consumption, labour and capital 
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have been investigated. The analysis was based on annual data in a period 1995–2010. Pairwise 
Granger Causality Test was used as the main method of research. 
The ﬁ rst part of article deals with theoretical eﬀ ect of taxes and tax burden on economic growth. 
Next, we examined development of tax burden in the European Union in a monitored period 
as ﬁ nancial and economic crisis has impacted also on tax systems. The structure of tax burden by 
economic functions reveals that the eastern EU member states generate a relatively high share of total 
revenues through consumption taxes. In the northern and central European states, revenues come 
predominantly from labour taxes. This is the result of a relatively high burden on the factor labour 
compared with the EU average. Between 1995 and 2010, labour taxes have decreased on average by 
1.9 percentage points, capital taxes have also decreased – by 2.1 p.p., but consumption taxes have 
mildly increased by 0.4 p.p. This development is in line with tax and economic theory as most authors 
recommend raising consumption taxes while at the same time lowering taxes on labour and capital 
can stimulate economic growth. Taxation of labour and capital should be kept low as it distorts 
decisions by economic agents; taxation on consumption has less adverse eﬀ ects in this respect. 
Finally, we investigated relationship between economic growth and tax burden by economic functions 
using Granger causality methodology. In short-term, there is two-way causality between change of 
implicit tax rate of consumption and GDP growth and also GDP growth Granger-cause change of 
implicit tax rate of capital and implicit tax rate of labour through one-way causality. 
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